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The recent case of Palsgraf v. Long Islond R. R.1 in the New
York Court of Appeals is in such direct conflict with the dicta
in Smit v. London a.ad SouthT Westxn Ry.,,2 the leading English
case on the question of liability for the unforeseeable conse-
quences of a negligent act, that a comparison of the two cases
may be of interest. The Smitlh case is of peculiar importance
for it has been cited with approval by Beven, Street, Bolen,
Jeremiah Smith and many other writers, and may be said to
be the foundation stone of the doctrine that there is liability
under such circumstances. Reference will also be made in this
article to the well-known case of In re Polemis 3 although the
point at issue in that case differed slightly from that involved
i~n the other two. It will be necessary to quote at some length
from the opinions of the judges in these cases so as to deter-
mine as definitely as possible the exact .'atio decidendi of each
decision. -
. In the PaIsgraf case a railway guard in assisting a passenger
to board a train knocked a package from his ans. A violent
explosion followed, the package having contained fireworks, of
which fact the guard was ignorant. The concussion knocked
over some scales standing a considerable distance away, and
in falling they injured the plaintiff, a woman, who was an
intending passenger. The judgment of the trial court in favor
of the plaintiff, affirmed by the Appellate Division, was re-
versed i a the Court of Appeals by a majority of four to three.
In speaking for the majority, Cardozo, C. J.1 emphasized the
1248, N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
2 L. !. 6 C. P. 14 (1870).
3 [1921] 3 K. B. 560.
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fact that, although the guard was negligent as regards the
holder of the package, he was not negligent in relation to the
plaintiff because he could not have foreseen that his act might
injure her:
"The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its. re-
lation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its
relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her
it was not negligence at all. Nothing in the situation gave
notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril
to persons thus removed." 4
The plaintiff did not establish lher case merely by proving that
her injury was the consequence of the defendant's "wrongful"
act for an act does not have the general quality of "wrongful-
ness." It may be a wrong in relation to one person without
necessarily being a wrong as to some one else:
"The argument for the plaintiff is built upon the shifting
meanings of such words as 'wrong' and 'wrongful,' and shares
their instability. What the plaintiff must show is a 'wrong' to
herself, i.e., a violation of her own right, and not merely a
wrong to some one else, nor conduct 'wrongful' because unsocial,
but not 'a wrong' to any one."
Just as the word "wrong" is a term of relation betveen two
persons, the plaintiff and the defendant, so is the word "negli-
gence." An act is not negligent per se-it is only negligent
in relation to those who are foreseeably within the risk of
injury. There is no such thing as negligence in the air:
"Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation. Negligence
in the abstract, apart from things related, is surely not a tort,
if indeed it is understandable at all (Bowen, L. 1., In Thomas
v. Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. D. 685, 694). Negligence is not a
tort unless it results in the commission of a wrong, and the
commission of a wrong imports the violation of a right, in
this case, we are told, the right to be protected against inter-
ference with one's bodily security. But bodily security is pro-
tected, not against all forms of interference or aggression, but
only against some. One who seeks redress at law does not
make out a cause of action by showing without more that there
has been damage to his person. If the harm was not willful, he
must show that the act as to him had possibilities of danger
so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against
the doing of it though the harm was unintended." C
In the instant case,, therefore, the plaintiff did not have a
4 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., supra note 1, at 341, 162 N. E. at D9.
5Ibid. 343, 162 N. ]. at 100.
0 Ibid. 345, 162 N. E. at 101.
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cause of action, for, although the guard had been negligent in
knocking the package out of the passenger's arms, and the direct
consequence of this negligent act was the explosion and injury
to the plaintiff, nevertheless, as a reasonable man in the posi-
tion of the guard could not have foreseen that his act might.
injure the plaintiff, no wrong against her was committed.
When we turn to the view of the minority, as ex-pressed in
the opinion of Andrews, T., we find that it is based on a funda-
mentally different conception of what constitutes "negligence,"
and a "wrongful act." According to him, negligence is not
merely a relation between particular individuals; it is also a
wrong to any one who may be injured by the negligent act,
even though the injury to him could not have been foreseen.
There is a duty to the world at large not to be negligent, and
therefore hny injury caused by the breach of this duty gives
a cause of action:
"The result we shall reach depends upon our theory as t6
the nature of negligence. Is it a relative concept-the breach
of some duty owing to a particular person or to particular
persons? Or where there is an act which unreasonably threatens
the safety of others, is the doer liable for all its proximate con-
sequences, even where they result in injury to one who would
generally be thought to be outside the radius of danger?""'
The result, therefoke, is that a negligent wrongdder is liable
for all the consequences of his act whether he could have fore-
seen them or not. The only limitation to this rule is that "The
damages must be so connected with the negligence that the
latter may be said to be the proxmnate cause of the former.""
71bid. 347, 162 N. E. at 102.
a It is obvious that a man cannot be held liable for all the consequences
of an act which has been found to be negligent for the consequences may
be infinite. Therefore, if the simple test of foreseeability is rejected
some other must be substituted for it. This is found in the convenient
phrase that the consequence must be proximate. Unfortunately it is
difficult to define what is meant by "proximate," so the courts have adopted
a series of metaphors and similes by means of which they hope to clarify
the subject. The most ;popular metaphor is "chain of causation" in
-which a cause remains proximate until the chain is snapped. So in
Weld-Blundell v. Stephens, [1920] A. C. 956, 936, Lord Sumner says:
"iIt is hard to steer clear of metaphors. Perhaps one may be forgiven
for saying that B. snaps the chain of causation; that he is no mere
conduit pipe through -which consequences flow from A. to C., no mere
moving part in a transmission gear set in motion by A.; that, in a word,
he insulates A. from C."
Unfortunately chains, conduit pipes, transmission gears, and insula-
tions do not appeal to Lord Shaw, for in Leyland Shipping Co. v. Nor-
wich Fire Insurance Society, 118 L. T. 120, 126 (1918), he says: "Causa-
tion is not a chain, but a net. At each point influences, forces, events,
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YALE LAW JOURNAL
Apart from that, the inquiry is simply as to the relation between
cadse and effect:
"The propostion is this. Every one owes to the world at
large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreason-
ably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. Not
only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be ex-
pected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he
be outside what would tenerally be thought the danger zone.
There needs be duty due the one complaining but this is not
a duty to a particular individual because as to him harm might
be expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the
act, not only that one alone, but all those in fact injured may
complain." 0
Judge Andrews then citesu ° with approval Scrutton, L. J.'s
statement in the Polemis case that the dropping of the plank
was negligent, for it might injure "workman or cargo or ship,"
and because of either possibility the owner of the vessel was
to be made good for his loss. The act being wrongful the doer
was liable for its proximiate results. He also cites the Smith/
case as laying down this principle.
The difference in view between Cardozo, C. J., and Andrews,
J., can be conveniently summed up as follows: According to
the former, negligence is a relation between particular indi-
viduals. It is not a wrong to third persons, and therefore they
cannot recover, even though they may have been injured by
the act. According to the latter, negligence is not only a wrong
to the particular individual foreseeably endangered by the act,
but also to any one who may be injured by it. A, who is
precedent and simultaneous, meet, and the radiation from each point
extends infinitely."
To Judge Andrews proximate cause is neither a chain nor a net, but
a river. In the Palsgraf case, supra note 1, at 352, 162 N. E. at 103, he
saysi "Should analogy be thought helpful, however, I prefer that of a
stream. The spiing, starting on its journey, is joined by tributary after
tributary. The river, reaching the ocean, comes from a hundred sources.
No man may say whence any drop of water is derived. Yet foi a timo
distinction may be possible. Into the clear creek, brown swamp water
flows from the left. Later, from the right comes water stained by its
clay bed. The three may remain for a space, sharply divided. But at
last, inevitably no trace of separation remains. They are so commingled
that all distinction is lost."
To the present writer proximate cause is neither a chain nor a net nor
a river, but is a labyrinthine maze. With all respect, may we not question
the validity of a legal concept which cannot be defined in precise, and
accurate terms but which must be described by a series, of conflicting
analogies?
9 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., supra note 1, at 350, 162 N. E. at 103.
10 Ibid.
n The facts in this case are given infra at 464.
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negligent in relation to B, by the same act injures C in an un-
foreseeable manner. The majority in the Pagraf case hold
that A is not liable to C. The minority hold that he is.
When we turn to the famous Smithz case we find it more diffi-
cult to determine the exact principle on which it was decided,
for the facts are less clearcut and the reasons given by the
different judges in their opinions are conflicting. The import-
ance of the case, however, is based not on the conclusion reached,
for this may be explained on a number of different grounds, but
on the dicta in three of the opinions, these dicta having been
quoted again and again by English and American writers. Be-
fore discussing the judgments themselves, it is necessary to
consider the facts. During an exceptionally hot summer the
defendant's workmen trimmed a hedge bordering the railway
line and allowed the trimmings to remain in heaps. A fire,
probably ignited by a spark from an engine, broke out in the
heaps, spread across a stubble field and over a road, and was
carried 200 yards by a high wind to the plaintiff's cottage which
was destroyed. On the trial a verdict -was found for the plain-
tiff, leave being reserved to the defendant to move .to enter a
verdict or a nonsuit. After argument the rule was discharged,
Bovill, C. J., and Keating, J., holding that there was sufficient
evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant in relation
to the plaintiff. Bovill, C. J., said:
"I think it is impossible to say that there was not evidence
from which a jury might be justified in concluding that there
was negligence as regards the plaintiff, and that the destruc-
tion of the cottage in which the plaintiff's goods were was
the natural consequence of their negligence.""
Brett, J., dissented on the ground that the defendant had
not been negligent in regard to this particular plaintiff, although
the act of leaving the inflammable heaps might have been negli-
gent in relation to others:
"But I am of opinion that no reasonable man could have
foreseen that the fire would consume the hedge and pass across
a stubble-field, and so get to the plaintiff's cottage at the dis-
tance of 200 yards from the railway, crossing a road in its pas-
sage. It seems to me that no duty was cast upon the defend-
ants, in relation to the plaintiff's property, because it was not
shown that the property was of such a nature and so situated
that the defendants ought to have known that by permitting
the rummage and hedge-trimmings to remain on the banks of
the railway they placed it in undue peril."
2 Reported in L. R. 5 C. P. 98 (1869-70).
13T1bi 107.
1, Ibid. 103.
At p. 104 he said: "We read of such fres in the American prairies;
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So far the case involved only, a simple question of fact, the
majority holding that on the evidence the defendant was negli-
gent in relation to the plaintiff, as it should have foreseen the
possibility of injury to him, while Brett, S., dissented on the
ground that no reasonable man could have foreseen such injury.
When the case reached the Exchequer Chamber the question
of law involved became a more difficult one, for, although the
seven judges were unanimous in affirming the judgment, they
differed in the reasons given. Some of them held, as the majority
had held in the court below, that on the evidence the defendant
should have foreseen that the fire might spread to the plain-
tiff's house. Thus Pigott, B., said:
".... when once in the field there was no way to stop it till
it burned the plaintiff's cottage, and this, as it seems to me, was
nothing but what a reasonable man might have anticipated." 'a
On this view of the facts the case is of no especial interest.
Three of the judges, however, held that even if the defendant
could not have foreseen that the fire might injure the plaintiff,
and therefore was not negligent as to the plaintiff himself,
nevertheless it was liable, as the injury to the plaintiff was
the natural consequence of its negligent act. Kelly, C. B.,
accepted the statement in the dissenting judgment of Brett, J.,
in the court below "that no reasonable man would have fore-
seen that the fire would get to the plaintiff's cottage," but held
the defendant liable because:
"I think, then, there was negligence in the defendants in
not removing these trimmings, and that they thus became re-
sponsible for all the consequences of their conduct, and that
the mere fact of the distance of this cottage from the point
where the fire broke out does not affect their liability, and that
the judgment of the Court below must be affirmed." if
Channell, B., said:
"I quite agree that where there is no direct evidence of negli-
gence, the question what a reasonable man might foresee is
of importance in considering the question whether there is evi-
dence for the jury of negligence or not,-but when it has been
but it would never occur, as it seems to me, to the mind of the most pru-
dent person that such an extraordinary conflagration could be caused
in this country in the manner here spoken of by the witnesses. I think
the defendants cannot reasonably be held responsible for not having
contemplated such an extraordinary combination of circumstances, or
such a result."
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once determined that there is evidence of negligence, the person
guilty of it is equally liable for its consequences, whether he
could have foreseen them or not."I8
Blackburn, J.'s judgment is, perhaps, the one which has been
most frequently quoted:I'
'q also agree that -what the defendants might yeasonably
anticipate is ... only material with reference to the question
whether the defendants were negligent or not, and cannot alter
their liability if they were guilty of negligence!' 20
These three dicta therefore laid down the rule that the de-
fendant, having acted negligently in leaving the trimmings, was
liable to the plaintiff even though, owing to the distance of the
plaintiff's cottage, no reasonable man would have foreseen that
he might be injured. In the Pa~sgrf case the defendant, having
acted negligently in knocking the package out of the passenger's
arms, was held not liable to the plaintiff standing far away
because "nothing in the situation gave notice that the falling
package had in it the potency of peril to persons thus removed."
In both cases there were negligent acts, viz., leaving the heaps
of trimmings and knocking the package from the passenger's
arms; in both cases the plaintiffs were injured as a consequence




The following passage in Blackburn, J's judgment has also been fre-
quently quoted:
.... if the negligence were once established, it would be no answer that
it did much more damage than was e-xected. If a man fires a gun across
a road where he may reasonably anticipate that persons will be passing,
and hits someone, he is guilty of negligence, and liable for the injury
he has caused; but if he fires in his own wood, where he cannot reasonably
anticipate that any one -ill be, he is not liable to any one whpm he shoots,
which shows that what a person may reasonably anticipate is important
in considering whether he has been negligent; but if a person fires across
a road when it is dangerous to do so and kills a man who is in receipt
of a large income, he will be liable for the whole damage, however great,
that may have resulted to his family, and cannot set up that he could
not reasonably have expected to have injured any one but a labourer."
But all that Blackburn, J., is proving here is that damages are not
limited to those "reasonably ex-pected." They may, howeve&, be foreseeable •
even though not reasonably expected, for there is sometimes a great
difference between foresight and expectation. The same rule applies in
determining the existence of negligence itself. If the law permitted the
shooting of labourers but not that of men with large incomes, then the
person firing across the road would be guilty of negligence if he hit
a man with a large income although he could only "reasonably expect"
td hit a labourer.
455
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any injury to the plaintiffs themselves but were negligent as to
others. Judge Andrews was, therefore, correct in pointing out
that the minority view in the Palsgmf case was in accordance
with the rule laid down in the Smith case while the majority view
was in conflict with it. This conflict will be referred to again
later in this article but it is of value to remember it while
considering the further history of the Smith case.
The importance of the Smith case was first stressed by Thomas
Beven in his famous work on Negligence. He refers to it as
"the leading case on the matter we are now dealing with," 2
he devotes Three pages to its analysis, and cites it five times
in the text and five times in the footnotes. He gives it as the
authority for his often quoted statemdnt that:
"It has been pointed out before that there are two inquiries
in the application of the test of what is a natural and reason-
able consequence: 1st, an inquiry whether the act causing in-
jury was wrongful; that being established, then, 2nd, what
are the actual continuous consequences of the wrongful act?
The liability is determined by looking a post not ab ante. The
defendant's view of the possibilities of his act is very material
to determine whether his act is negligent or not; it is utterly
immaterial to limit liability when once negligence has been
established." 22
Later, in referring to Kelly, C. B.'s statement that "no reason-
able man would have foreseen that'the fire would consume the
hedge and pass across a stubble field and so get to the plain-
tiff's cottage," he says, "The effect of this is that, negligence
being found, it is not necessary to find, in addition, an ante-
cedent probability of damage to tany given propertj or person." 23
Compare this with Cardozo, C. .'s statement that, "what the
plaintiff must show is a 'wrong' to herself, i.e., a violation of
her own right, and not merely a wrong to some one else, nor
conduct 'wrongful' because unsocial, but not 'a wrong' to any
one." 2
4
Beven's theory was accepted in full by Street in his Founda-
tion of Legal Liability, and thus its influence on American legal
thought was increased. He refers to it as follows:
"Two important principles are involved in this [Beven's]
theory, namely, (1) that foresight of harm is an essential an-
tecedent condition of liability, and (2) that when negligence
is shown the defendant's conduct thereby becomes tortious, or,
as it were, unlawful per se, and he is then chargeable with all
21 1 BEvEN, NEGLIGENCE (3d ed. 1908) 87.
22 Ibid. 89, n. 2.
23Ibid. 496. Italics mine.
24 Cited supra at 450.
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injurious consequences whic]l proximately follow and which
are not too remote." 5
According to Street it is not necessary in determining the ques-
tion of liability to show that a reasonable man in the position
of the defendant should have been able to foresee the harm
which befalls the person injured. "It is enough if an ordinarily
prudent person should be able to see danger or harm of some
sort ahead. Harm in the abstract, not harm in the concrete, is
the idea." 2 6 Compare with this Judge Cardozo's statement that,
"negligence in the abstract, apart from things related, is surely
not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all."
We next find the Smithb case, and Beven's interpretation of it,
used by Professor Bohlen as the basis of his frequently quoted
article, Te P'obable Or The Natura Consequence As The Test
Of Liabiitj In NegligenceF7 He refers to Beven as follows:
"He [Beven] it was who first drew attention to the, different
rule of cause and effect applicable to the existence of negligence
and the liability for the consequences thereof, between probable
and natural consequences." 2 8 He also quotes - O with approval
the judgment of Blackburn, J., in the Smith case. There is no
indication that he does not accept the full implication of the
doctrine of natural consequences. In his own words the rule
is stated in these broad terms:
"Where such a rule of conduct established by public policy
for the good of all is violated, the wrongdoer should answer
for all the consequence brought about by the working out of
the injurious tendency of his wrongful act until the ordinary
natural 30 laws of cause and effect are diverted by some outside
agency." 3
This duty of care of the defendant to the plaintiff not to violate
"a rule of conduct established by public policy for the good of
all" is similar to Judge Andrews' rule that "every one owes to
the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts thaL
2- 1 STREET, Tnn FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LTABnIIy (1906) 91.
26 Ibid. 104.
27 (1901) 49 Am. L. REG. (N. s.) 79, 148. Reprinted in STUDIES IN THE
LAw OF ToRns (1926) 1.
,281ba 8, n. 11.
29 lbjr 7.
o It is not clear to the writer -what is meant by "ordinary naturaL"
If. by "ordinary" is meant "usual," then Professor BohIends rule is more
restricted than is the rule that all damages musb be foreseeable, which
he claims is too narrow. "Natural" is meaningless, for as Lord Sumner
says in Weld-Blundell v. Stephens, [1920] A. C. 956, 983, 'verything
that happens, happens in the order of nature and is therefore 'natural."
3 1 STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 2.
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may unreasonably threaten the safety of others." 32 Professor
Bohlen's statement can, therefore, be quoted in support of the
minority view in the Pasgraf ease, for the guard in that case
was a wrongdoer who had violated a rule of conduct established
by public policy for the good of all, and the ordinary natural
effect of his act was to cause the plaintiff's injury.
Whether Professor Bohlen intended to follow to its full extent
the doctrine laid down in the dicta in the Smnith case and ac-
cepted as correct by Beven is, however, doubtful, for in a note
to his article he says:
"Practically the same view is taken by Sir Frederick Pollock
in his valuable treatise on the Law of Torts: 'The kind of harm
which in fact happened might have been expected, though the
precise manner in which it happened was determined by an
extraneous accident.' " 33
But Pollock is the most strenuous opponent of Beven's "subtle
interpretation," and of the dicta in the Smith case.34 According
to him "the accepted test of liability for negligence in the first
instance is... also the proper measure of liability for the con-
sequences of proved or admitted default." The correct test cen
be simply phrased: "Is this damage such as the defendant could
reasonably be expected to anticipate?" This depends upon fore-
sight. Of course the foresight need not be of the "precise
manne," for if it were men would rarely be liable for negli-
gence. If I negligently set my house on fire I can foresee that
the conflagration may spread to the houses of my neighbors A,
B, or C, although the precise manner will depend upon the pre-
vailing wind. But if the fire spreads to oil in a stream, and
burns a house a mile away, I cannot foresee the manner at
all.3-5 We are, therefore, left in some doubt as to Professor
32 Cited supra at 452.
3 3 
BOHLN, STUDIES IN THE LAW Or ToRTs (1926) 8, n. 15.
3 4 See Pollock, Liability for Cosequences (1922) 38 L. Q. REV. 165.
35 The following illustrations taken from Professor Bingham's admirable
article, Legal Cause at Common Law, (1909) 9 CoL. L. Bugv. 16, are ap-
posite here:
"Plaintiff owns two houses, A and B, near the bank of a stream. A
is on a lot next below one belonging to defendant. B is a mile farther
down. Defendant negligently builds a fire on his lot so near A as to put
it in peril from sparks. However, A is saved by vigorous efforts. The
fire unavoidably spreads through the grass to a stream and ignites oil
floating on the surface. The oil has been spilled into the stream in
large quantities by accident. This was unknown to defendant; and ho
-was not negligent in not knowing or foreseeing that the oil was there.
The oil carries the fire down-stream and B is burned.
"I suppose that we shall agree that plaintiff cannot recover from de-
fendant for the loss of B, though the building of the fre constituted
[Vol. 89
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Bohlen's exact position as he seems to accept the conflicting
views of both Beven and Pollock.
The same doubt arises when we read the famous articles by
Judge Jeremiah Smith entitled LegaZ Cause in Actions of Tort.
He cites with approval the Smitk case which he terms "the lead-
ing English case in this direction," 37 and gives quotations from
the judgments of Channell, B., and Blackburn, J.Po He also
endorses without any qualification the views expressed by Beven
and Street. He states his conclusion in the following broad
terms:
"The probability that some harm will ensue may sometimes
be a legal test of the tortiousness of defendants conduct But
if it be once established that his conduct was tortious, and
throughout this discussion we are proceeding upon the supposi-
tion that this has been established, then we submit that the
probability or improbability of a result does not furnish a legaZ
test of the existence of causative relation between defendants
tori and plaintiffs damage." s9
This, apparently, would support the minority view in the
Palsgraf case for the defendant's conduct in that case was
tortious and the plaintiff's damage was a result of the conduct.
But in a later passage he limits this statement as follows:
"The answer is, that the harm which was foreseeable and
the specific harm which actually resulted need not be absolutely
identical. Undoubtedly they must both relate to the same persons
or class of persons, and to the same subject matter, i.e. to an
infringement of the same right in the plaintiff; but these re-
quirements are consistent with wide variations as to the mode
of bringing about the harm, and the precise nature and extent
of the harn. If there is a substantial likelihood that certain
conduct, when pursued by the defendant, will result in some
appreciable harm to the plaintiff's person, then the defendant
a breach of legal duty owed plaintiff and B was burned as a consequence
of the wrongful act ...
"Now assume that A caught fire, not directly, but through the ignition
of the oiL Defendant should not be held responsible for the loss. The
case is analogous to the one just discussed. There has been an act vhich
was 'legal' negligence towards plaintiff because it endangered A, and A
has been destroyed as a consequence of the act; but the avoidance of the
contingency through which A was destroyed was mot within the scope
of the duty which defendant has infringed. Not kmowing of the presence
of the oil on the stream, he committed no 'legal' wrong towards plaintiff
in causing it to ignite. His wrong consisted only in imperiling A by
sparks direct from the fire where he started it." INd 26.
Reprinted in SELEcTED EssAYs ox Tim LAW or ToRTs (Harvard Law





if he so conducts (sic), cannot escape liability on the ground
that he could not foresee the precise manner in which the harm
would occur, nor the exact nature of the harm, nor the full
extent of such harm. What must be foreseen in order to estab-
lish negligence is 'harm in the abstract, not harm in the con-
crete.' "40
It is difficult to understand how Judge Smith reconciles this
limitation with the Smith case, which he approves so whole-
heartedly, for in that case the whole point was that there was
no "substantial likelihood"-nor, for; that matter, any likelihood
-of harm to the plaintiff. The fact that fire would burn a house
was obviously foreseeable; that it would burn the paintiff's
house was the one fact which was unforeseeable in the case.
Nor can any trace of this limitation be found in either Bevbn or
Street with whom Judge Smith seems to think that he agrees
and whose reasoning he adopts. The odd result is that it would
be possible to quote different passages from Judge Smith's
articles to show that he was in accord with the views expressed
in both the majority and minority opinions in the Palsgraf
case.
In saying that "the harm which was foreseeable and the specific
harm which actually resulted need not be absolutely identical,"
Judge Smith was stating an obvious truism. There is no re-
ported case, so far as the writer knows, which has ever required
absolute foresight as to the specific harm. If there were such
a rule then the law of negligence would be unworkable tand
meaningless. If a man driving down a street at a furious pace
runs down a pedestrian he will be held liable because a reason-
able man under the circumstances would have foreseen that he
might injure someone on the street. The foresight required
here is not the foresight that a specific person will be injured
in a specific way, viz., by being struck by the left wheel and
having his right arm broken, but that someone will be struck
in some way and suffer some bodily injury. This is, however,
entirely different from saying that the driver is negligent as
to all the consequences of 'his fast diiving. It is conceivable
that the friction produced by his speed might set off a hidden
mine under the road, but he could not have foreseen that type
of consequence and therefore would not be negligent in relation
to it.
There is a clear distinction between (1) foresight as to specific
consequences produced in a specific manner; (2) foresight as to
consequences of a general kind produced in any one of a number
of foreseeable manners; and (3) no foresight as to either the
kind of consequence or the manner in which it has been pro-
40 Ibid. 690.
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duced. It is the second kind of foresight which is required in
determining negligence, and it is only this second kind of fore-
sight which ought to be required in determining liability for
the consequences of that negligence. '
Professor Beale in his article Tie Proximatc Consequences of
A% Act-42 adopts an original line of approach to the question
so that it is not surprising to find that no reference is made to
Beven, Street, or Bohlen. He does, however, cite the SmitZ
case with approval. 4 3 His doctrine is that to hold the defendant
liable the force he has created "must (a) have remained active
itself or created another force which remained active until it
directly caused the result; or (b) have created a new active
isk of being acted upon by the active force that caused the
result." 44 The Smith, case would fall under (b), for the de-
fendants in leaving the dry. heaps created an active Wisk which
was acted upon by the active force that caused the resul The
facts of the Talsgr'f case would seem to bring it within (a),
for the active force of the guard in knocking down the package
created the explosion which remained active until it injured the
plaintiff. The majority opinion in that case is therefore in
,conflict with Professor Beale's doctrine.
Beven, Street, Bohlen, Judge Smith and Beale may be said
to be the classical authorities on this subject, and have there-
fore been discussed at length. Shorter references must be made
to a number of recent articles which are of importance.
Professor Green in his book on Rationale of Proxbmate CQawe
cites the Smith case with marked approval, giving lengthy quo-
tations from the judgments of Channell, B., and Blackburn, X.45
He suggests that cases conflicting with their views are "legal
ata-ocities." But in a recent article he also approves the result
41This is all that was laid down in the often quoted case of Hill v.
Winsor, 118 Mass. 251 (1875), in which Colt 3., said, "... it is not neces-
sary that injury in the precise form in which it in fact resulted should
'have been foreseen." Ibid. 259.
That case also illustrates how impossible it is to draw a line between
the question as to -whether the defendant vas negligent and the question
as to -what -were the consequences of his negligence. The caze is usually
cited to prove that there need not be foresight as to consequences, then
in fact the point at issue -was -vhether there -was any negligence on the
part of the defendant in running into the fender. Thus Colt, 3., said:
'It cannot be said, as matter of law, that the jury might not properly
find it obviously probable that injury in some form vould be caused to
those -who were at -work on. the fender by the act of the defendants in
running against it. This constitutes negligence . . ." Ibid. 258.
42 Reprinted in SB1EOrD EssAYs ON T E LAW OF Tomrs, op. ci. supra
mote 36, at 730.
sIbid. 739, n. 291
"Ibd. 755.
-s G E , RATioNALn or PaoxmA=s CAuss (1927) 88.
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reached in the Pa~sgraf case.40 It would be interesting to see how
he reconciles these cases.
Professor Levitt in his article Cause, LegaZ Cause and Proxi-
mate Cause,47 discards the test of foreseeability because it is
"not only psychologically impossible but is practically not em-
ployed by the jury."481 In its place he offers the doctrine of
forbidden causal action which "simply asks: Did the defendant
do or fail to do that which was forbidden. Then it asks: Is
this act or omission so connected causally with the injury com-
plained of that the forbidden act or omission can be said legally
to be a proximate cause of the injury?" He approves of the
Smith case because "the defendant's activity results in the crea-
tion of the force which produces the injury of the plaintiff." 4
He doubtless would disapprove of the conclusion reached in
the Palsgraf case as in it the plaintiff's injury was the result
of the defendant's activity.
Professor McLaughlin in his article on Proximate Cause 10
suggests that, "The idea is that the man who 'starts something'
should be responsible for what he has started.... As here de-
limited in the interests of comparative certainty, the 'some-
thing' to which the legal rule applies is an active force, con-
tinuously producing change." ' He cites 82 with approval Beven,.
Street, Bohlen, Judge Smith, and Lord Justice Banks' judg-
ment in the Polemis case r which he quotes at some length.
Later in his article he suggests a radical limitation of the doc-
trine of "direct consequences" which cannot be found in the
authorities he cites:
"As already suggested, some courts state that only probable
or foreseeable results are proximate. If this view be rejected,
and it be admitted that all direct results are proximate and
that consequently the sweep of an active force as defined in
that connection may carry proximate causation to an unforesee-
able result, it is entirely consistent to hold that vhat must be
appreciably probable or foreseeable is not the result, but the
forces which intervene between the defendant's act and the
harm." r4
6 The Duty Problem In Negligence Cases (1928) 28 CoL. L. It v. 1014,
1031.
47 (1922) 21 MICE. L. REv. 34.
-Is 16. 52.
49Ibid. 57. This is hardly an accurate summary of the Smith case.
The defendant did not create the force-the fire-which produced tho
injury. It negligently allowed heaps to remain which were accidentally sob
on fire.
50 (1925) 39 HARV. L. lBv. 149:
ul Ibi.L 164.
O1Ibid 163, n. 50.
53Discussed infr c at 464.
s4 McLaughlin, op. cit. supra note 50, at 179.
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But this requirement that the forces must be foreseeable is in
absolute conflict with the Pozris case, for the whole point of
that case was that the intervening force-the explosion-was
unforeseeable. Once given the force, then the result which fol-
lowed-the destruction of the ship-was inevitable. As Pro-
fessor McLaughlin, therefore, seems both to approve and dis-
approve of the primary authority which he cites, it is difficult
to determine his exact position.
Professor Edgerton in his article on LegaZ Caue r, says that
"Except only the defendant's intention to produce a given result,
no other consideration so affects our feeling that it is or is not
just to hold him for the result as its foreseeability" ; 11 but
"As Professor Bohlen, Professor Smith and Professor Beale
have shown, it is not always necessary."" He cites with ap-
proval the Smith case, but suggests that there was a slight
chance of harm" to Smith which, taken together with the negli-
gence to others, made the act negligent as to him. The difficulty
with this particular refinement is that it does not seem to have
occurred to any of the judges in the Smit7 case, and is in direct
conflict with the language there used. The whole point of the
dicta in the case was that the defendant was liable to the plain-
tiff even though it could not foresee any injury to him.z
55 (1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 211, 343.
56 Ibd. 352.
s57Ibifd. 354.
asProfessor Edgerton also objects to the rule -which requires forezee-
ability because it is 9lighlr indefinite." He says, i. 233:
"For erample, if, from the point of view of a reasonable man (an in-
definite idea) with D's information, D's act produced a substantial risk
(an indefinite idea) that a force of the general character of that which
intervened (an indefinite idea) would cause harm of the general character
of that which occurred (an indefinite idea), D's act is a legal cause of
the harm; otherwise it is not"
This has been answered by Professor McLaughlin in his article, op. cit
supra note 50, at 190:
"In like style, the following may be stated: If A communicates with B
(an indefinite idea) so as to give B a reasonable impression (an indefinite
idea) that A is offering to enter into a contract with him, and if B
then within a reasonable time under the circumstances (an indefinite idea)
does acts which should give a reasonable man in A's situation (an in-
definite idea)i to understand that he accepts this offer, or if A otherwise
receives good or valuable consideration (an indefinite idea) for a promise
he makes B, then he becomes bound to B, and B can recover the damages
in the contemplation of the parties (a very indefinite and fictitious idea)
if A does not perform his promise, though A may be discharged from
duty to perform if B makes a breach going to the essence of the contract
(an indefinite idea). Still it cannot be fairly said that there is no law
of contracts or that no definite rules can be established, or that a contract
case should be handed over to a jury with an instruction to do justice
with a view to certain 'tendencies' in the decisions."
YALE LAW JOURNAL
This formidable list of textbook authorities has been collected
not for the purpose of showing that in the Palsgraf case the
majority of the Court of Appeals was wrong in its conclusion,
but, on the contrary, to point out that probably the strongest
court in the United States, has, after prolonged consideration
and in a case which clearly presented the problem, reached a
conclusion in direct conflict with the Smitk case which Beven,
Street, Bohlen, Jeremiah Smith, and Beale cited in support of
their views. The Court of Appeals has repudiated the argument
which is "built upon the shifting meanings of such words as
'wrong' and 'wrongful' and shares their instability." To this
list of shifting words might be added "negligent act" (Beven) ;
"conduct unlawful per se" (Street) ; "wrongful act" (Bohlen) ;
"tortious conduct" (Judge Smith) ; and "harmful act" (Beale).
With all respect, the writer believes that the majority of the
Court of Appeals reached the correct solution when it held
that "the plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong personal
to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty
to another." It is not sufficient to show that the act was negli-
gent; it is necessary to prove that a reasonable man in the posi-
tion of the defendant should have foreseen that the laintiff
might be injured thereby.
So far we have been discussing the question whether A who
has been negligent in relation to B can be held liable to C who
has been injured unforeseeably by the same act. This must not
be confused with the further question whether A who has done
an act which might injure B in a foreseeable manner is liable
to B if the act injures him in an unforeseeable manner. As
Judge Cardozo has pointed out, the answer to these two problems
is not necessarily the same. 9 It is unfortunate that this dis-
tinction has not been made as clearly by other writers who have
dealt with the subject. But although the two questions are
distinct, nevertheless they are analogous, and it may therefore
be of value to discuss the second question here.
The second question was the one involved in the Polemis
case.60 A workman, employed by the defendants, dropped a
plank into the hold of the plaintiff's ship, thereby causilng an
explosion of petrol vapor which destroyed the ship. The arbi-
trators found that the workman could not have anticipated the
explosion but should have foreseen other possible injury. The
M "The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to tho
case before us. The question of liability, is always anterior to the ques-
tion of the measure of the consequences that go with liability." Pals.
graf v. Long Island M- R., supra note 1, at 346, 162 N. E. at 101.60 The writer has attempted to analyze this case in his article, LiAnirr.
POR THE CONSEQUENCES OF A "NEGLIGENT AcT," CAMBRIDGE LEGAL ESSAYS
(1926).
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Court of Appeal held the defendants liable even though the
damage caused could not have been foreseen. Does this conclu-
sion conflict with that reached in the Palsgrf case?
As far as authority is concerned there is a conflict, for each of
the three Lord Justices in the Polanis case cited the dicta in
the Smitl case as the primary authority for their judgments,
and they assumed, without any question, that the principle of
both cases was the same. Beven's interpretation of these dicta
was also approved. It is, therefore, reasonable to suggest that
if the Lord Justices had felt themselves to be bound by such
a principle as was laid down in the Palsgraf case, instead of that
of the Smitm case, they would have reached an opposite con-
clusion.
As far as logic is concerned it is submitted that the problem
in the Polenis case, although different from, is so similar to
the one at issue in the Smithb and Palsgraf cases, that the same
raYa odecidendi should be followed, and that the conclusion which
a court faced with such a problem will reach will depend upon
whether it considers the reasoning of the Smit. or of the Pals-
graf case correct. The only reason for holding a person liable
for unforeseeable consequences is that his act has the quality
of wrongfulness, and that where one of two persons must lose,
it is the wrongdoer who ought to suffer. This, in substance, is
the argument advanced by the minority and rejected by the
majority in the PaZsgraf case. But if we once reject the idea
that an act has a general quality of wrongfulness where different
persons are concerned, it would seem to follow logically that we
must also reject the idea that an act has a general quality of
wrongfulness where different consequences are concerned.
"Negligence," says Judge Cardozo, "is thus a term of relation,"
but the relation is one to consequences as well as to persons.
A is negligent in relation to B because he may injure him in a
certain manner. A cannot be negligent to B "in the air." To
hold A, who has been negligent to B in relation to certain fore-
seeable consequences, liable to B for unforeseeable consequences
is no more reasonable than to hold A liable for such consequences
if they happen to C. If a distinction is to be drawn between
these two cases some illogical results may follow, as the follow-
ing illustration will make clear.
The ship Clara, belonging to B, is loaded with cargo belonging
to C. A negligently drops a plank which might foreseeably dent
the hull of the ship but cannot foreseeably injure the cargo. In
an unforeseeable manner the falling plank starts a fire which
destroys the ship and the cargo. According to the reasoning
in the Palsgraf case, A is not liable to C for the destruction of
the cargo, for nothing in the situation gave notice that the
falling plank had in it the potency of peril to C's cargo. On the
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other hand, if we accept the ratio decidendi of the Smith case,
then A is liable to Q, for theie was negligence in dropping the
plank and the consequence of this conduct was the destruction of
the cargo. Now shift the problem by having both the ship and
the cargo belong to the same owner B. It is obvious that a
court which follows the Smith case will hold A liable to B. This
is substantially what the English Court of Appeal held in the
Polemis case. What would a court, which accepted the doctrine
of the Palsgraf case, hold when faced with this problem? It is
submitted that it would hold that A .was not liable to B, for A's
liability cannot reasonably be made to depend upon who owns the
cargo. On what possible principle can A's liability be affected
by the fact of ownership? If A is not liable when the ship
and the cargo belong to different persons why should he be
liable when they belong to the same person? In neither case
has he been negligent in relation to the cargo, and therefore in
neither case ought he to be held liable for its destruction. The
reason which applies in the one case ought to apply in the other.
It must be pointed out here, however, that there is a sentence
in Judge Cardozo's opinion which may be construed as suggest-
ing that he takes the view that the problems need not necessarily
be decided in the same manner: "We may assume, without
deciding, that negligence, not at large or in the abstract,, but
in relation to the plaintiff, would entail liability for any and all
consequences, however novel or extraordinary." " That he did
not, however, intend to express any definite view on this point,
which was not before him, appears from the citations he gives.
The first one is to Bird v. St. Paul F. and M. Ix. Co.,22 in which
he had written, "Others would have us say that reasonable prob-
ability of injury is important, not so much in measuring the
extent of liability for wrong, as in determining whether there
has been a wrong. ... We need not go into these refinements."
The second reference isto Ehrgott v. Mayor, Etc. of City of
New York 3 All th tfthat case held was that the specific harm
which actually res ted need not be absolutely foreseeable; as
the court said, "N'othing short of Omniscience could have fore-
seen"' that. Bu 'thbis is far different from saying that the de-
fendant wvould le liable "for any and all consequences however
novel or extraodinary.Nll either the facts of the Ehrgott case,
nor the words bf the opinion, go as far as that.
Among other references which Judge Cardozo gives are cita-
tions from the Smith case and the words of Beven and Street.
As we have attempted to show, these are in direct conflict with
the Palsgraf case itself.
61 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., supra note 1, at 846, 162 N. E. at 101.
62224 N. Y. 47, 54, 120 N. B. 86, 88 (1918).
6396 N. Y. 264 (1884).
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Moreover, Judge Cardozo points out that the doctrine of lia-
bility "for any and all consequences" may be too broad, and
that it may not apply where there is a diversity of interestsP4
If the courts once adopt such a distinction, then we are faced
with the terrifying prospect of a whole new series of cases in
which it will be necessary to consider whether or not a person
has the same interest in his foot and his eye, in his two'adjoin-
ing houses, in his ship and the cargo which it carries. Obviously
a single distinction between bodily security on the one hand
and property security on the other, would be too broad.
It is, however, unnecessary to discuss here at any further
length the question whether or not the principle of the PaIgraf
case conflicts with that of the Polemis case. The important
point to realize is that it is in absolute conflict with the dicta
in the Smith case and with Beven's interpretation of them. It
is on the Smith case and on Beven that the modern doctrine of
liability for unforeseeable consequences has been primarily
founded, for, as has been shown above, almost every writer on
this subject has quoted and approved them. In view of the
authority which any opinion written by Judge Cardozo, and.
indorsed by the majority of the New York Court of Appeals,
must necessarily have, it is suggested that the validity of this
generally accepted doctrine should be reconsidered. Is it not
more logical to say, as Sir William Holdsworth does, that, "If
we are basing liability upon a negligent act, and if negligence
consists in a failure to foresee results which ought reasonably
to have been foreseen, it would seem that the negligent person
ought only to be made liable to the extent to which he ought to
have foreseen those results"? 65
6 "There is room for argument that a distinction is to be dravn accord-
ing to the diversity of interests invaded by the act, as where conduct
negligent in that it threatens an insignificant invasion of an interest in
propsrty results in an nforeseeable invasion of an interest of another
order, as, e. g., one of bodily security. Perhaps other distinctions may be
necessary. We do not go into the question now." PaIsgraf v. Long
Island R. R., supra note 1, at 346, 162 X. B. at 101.
s 8 HoDswoRTH, HisTo~y or ExmSH LAw (1926) 463.
